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When Britain Turned Inward: The Impact of Interwar 
British Protection†
By Alan de Bromhead, Alan Fernihough, Markus Lampe,  
and Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke*
International trade collapsed, and also became much less multi lateral, 
during the 1930s. Previous studies, looking at  aggregate trade flows, 
have argued that trade policies had relatively little to do with either 
phenomenon. Using a new dataset incorporating highly  disaggregated 
information on the United Kingdom’s imports and trade  policies, we 
find that while conventional wisdom is correct  regarding the impact of 
trade policy on the total value of British imports,  discriminatory trade 
policies can explain the majority of Britain’s shift toward Imperial 
imports in the 1930s. (JEL F13, F14, F54, N74)
In a recent survey paper, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016) note that trade economists 
have moved away from studying the impact of trade policy. They point out that this 
may partly reflect a belief that trade policy no longer matters, since by and large it 
has become so liberal.1 But they also note that studies estimating the impact of trade 
policies in the 1970s and 1980s, when these were not so uniformly liberal, suggest 
that they had no big effect then either. Does trade policy matter, they ask. Did it 
ever matter?
1 However, Bown and Crowley (2016) argue that substantial trade barriers in fact remain in place today.
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If trade policy ever mattered, it surely did so during the 1930s. This paper 
 examines the dramatic shift toward protection which occurred in the United 
Kingdom from 1931 onward. It asks whether tariffs and quotas can help to explain 
the British import collapse of the period. It also asks whether trade policy contrib-
uted to one of the most notable features of interwar trade, namely its decreasingly 
multilateral nature. Table 1 documents an increasing share of empires, or informal 
spheres of influence, in the trade of several leading countries between 1929 and 
1938. The British Empire accounted for 30 percent of UK imports in 1929, but 
42 percent in 1938. How much of this shift was due to discriminatory British trade 
policies?
Contemporary and subsequent observers thought that increasingly bilateral 
trade not only reflected, but potentially exacerbated, the international tensions 
of the period. According to Hilgerdt (1935, p. 188), “As bilateralism  particularly 
 renders the supply of raw materials to certain countries difficult, it  threatens 
to lead to an intensified fight for influence upon (or the domination of) the 
undeveloped  countries, and thereby to political controversies, which may 
adversely affect all forms of  peaceful collaboration between nations.” During 
the war, J. B. Condliffe wrote that “it is now so obvious as to hardly need 
statement that  bilateral trade took on aggressive and destructive aspects as 
international rivalries were sharpened in the era of what is now known as pre-bel-
ligerancy” (Condliffe 1941, p. 287). After the war, Article  1 of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) banned discriminatory trade policies, 
subject to a number of well-known exceptions. But did discriminatory inter-
war trade policies actually play an important role in making world trade less 
multilateral, and more focused on imperial blocs, as was widely assumed at 
the time?
Table 1—Share of Formal and Informal Empire in Trade, 1929–1938 (percent)
In imports In exports
Trade of Share of 1929 1932 1938 1929 1932 1938
United Kingdom British Commonwealth, colonies, protectorates, etc. 30.2 36.4 41.9 44.4 45.4 49.9
United States Phillippines 2.9 6.1 4.8 1.6 2.8 2.8
France French colonies, protectorates, and mandated 
territories
12 20.9 25.8 18.8 31.5 27.5
Belgium Belgian Congo 3.9 3.8 8.3 2.6 1.3 1.9
Netherlands Netherlands overseas territories 5.5 5 8.8 9.4 5.9 10.7
Italy Italian colonies and Ethiopia 1.5 1.1 1.8 2.1 3.6 23.3
Portugal Portuguese overseas territories 7.9 10.4 10.2 12.7 13.9 12.2
Japan Korea and Formosa 12.3 26.2 30 16.8 21.6 32.9
Kwantung 6 4 1.6 4.8 6.8 13.7
Manchuria 1.9 2.7 9 2.5 1.5 8.1
Rest of China 5.8 4 4.4 10.9 7.3 8
Total Japanese sphere of influence 26 36.9 45 35 37.2 62.7
Germany Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Turkey,  
and Yugoslavia
4.5 5.5 12 5 3.9 13.2
Latin America 12.2 11.2 15.6 7.8 4.3 11.5
Total German sphere of influence 16.7 16.7 27.6 12.8 8.2 24.7
Source: League of Nations (1939, pp. 34–35)
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The academic literature of recent decades has tended to downplay the impact of 
protectionism on overall trade flows during the Great Depression.2 World income 
and output fell so much during this period that this can plausibly account for the 
majority of the 1929–33 trade collapse, leaving relatively little for rising trade bar-
riers to explain. The literature has also concluded that trade policies played only 
a minor role in driving the balkanization of trade during the 1930s. These  studies 
use data on aggregate trade flows, average measures of protection (in particular, 
the trade-weighted average tariff), and trade bloc dummies. In contrast, we use 
 disaggregated, commodity and country-specific information on both trade flows and 
trade policies for one major economy, the UK. Using contemporary sources, we 
hand-collected data on United Kingdom imports of 258 goods from 42 countries 
over the 15  years 1924 –38. This required typing information on imports of 847 
 individual product  categories from 49 countries and subregions. We also collected 
 granular,  commodity, and  country-specific information on tariffs and non-tariff bar-
riers to trade. Both the original dataset involving the 847 product categories, and the 
 258-good dataset, are freely available online for other researchers to use.3
We find that the conventional wisdom is correct when it comes to the impact of 
protection on overall trade flows: it only accounted for around one-quarter of the 
 1929–33 UK import collapse. However, we also find that tariffs and quotas were 
the major reason why the share of UK imports coming from the British Empire 
increased during the 1930s. Having disaggregated data on trade and trade  policy 
turns out to be relatively unimportant when it comes to estimating the impact of 
protection on the aggregate value of UK imports. However, we show that it is 
crucial when it comes to estimating the impact of protection on the geographical 
 composition of trade.
Our use of disaggregated trade data mirrors the approach taken by Anderson and 
Yotov (2016) and Baier, Bergstrand, and Clance (2017), but whereas these authors 
use “economic integration agreement” or “free trade agreement” dummies as 
 explanatory variables, we use information on commodity-specific tariffs and quotas 
that explicitly discriminated between Empire and “foreign” imports. Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2016, p. 181) comment that “given the central role that trade elasticity 
plays in a number of trade models and in welfare analysis, it is surprising that trade 
policy has not been exploited to a larger extent to identify this crucial parameter”: 
we identify trade elasticities by exploiting the fact that the UK shift to protection 
increased tariffs on foreign imports of particular goods more than it increased the 
tariffs facing imports of the same goods coming from the Empire. Our paper is thus 
related to Caliendo and Parro (2015), who estimate sectoral trade elasticities using 
information on the tariff reductions associated with the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Our decision to focus in detail on the experience of one (very 
important) country responds to the appeal of Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016) for more 
context-specific evidence on the impact of trade policies; our granular approach 
reveals a large impact of interwar trade policy that previous aggregate studies did 
not detect.
2 Madsen (2001) is an exception; see footnote 5. 
3 They can be accessed at https://cepr.org/content/trade-depression/uk-interwar-trade-data. 
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A. Relationship to Previous Literature and Road Map
Interwar Protection and the Total Value of Trade.—Despite the reputation of 
 interwar protectionism, the quantitative literature has not been kind to claims 
that the global trade collapse of 1929–33 was mainly due to trade policy.4 In an 
 influential contribution, Irwin (1998b) quantifies the impact of the Smoot-Hawley 
tariff, using quarterly aggregate US import data to estimate a partial equilibrium 
US import demand equation. His measure of trade policy is the trade-weighted 
average tariff, i.e., tariff revenue as a share of dutiable imports. He finds that even 
in the absence of any change in ad valorem tariff rates (but accounting for the 
income declines of the period), US imports would have declined by 31.9 percent 
between 1930:II and 1932:III, as compared with the 41.2 percent reduction that 
actually took place: the vast majority of the US import collapse was due to falling 
income. The conclusion that frictions were much less important than collapsing 
income and output in lowering trade during the 1930s is generally accepted, though 
there have been some dissenting voices.5
A frequently cited dissenting voice, in the context of the United Kingdom, is 
Kitson and Solomou (1990). They estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sions for 1924 –38, in which the log of manufactured imports are a function of the 
log of real gross domestic product (GDP), the log of the  relative price of British and 
foreign manufactured goods, and the ad valorem tariff rate, assumed to be equal to 
zero between 1924 and 1931. Their tariff coefficient implies that the tariff increase 
between 1930 and 1933 lowered UK manufactured imports by 48 percent. Other 
contributors to the UK debate have similarly used aggregate time series methods 
rather than gravity methods, and often rather crude measures of protection.6
Interwar Trade Policies and the Decline of Multilateral Trade.—To date, the 
 literature using gravity methods to estimate the impact of interwar trade  policies on 
the geographical pattern of trade has focused on the impact of trade bloc  membership. 
Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) estimate cross-sectional gravity  equations for 1928, 
1935, and 1938, using aggregate trade data for 34  countries (and 561 bilateral 
flows). While they find that pairs of countries that both belonged to the British 
Commonwealth traded more with each other, this effect was already present in 
1928, before Britain moved to protection, and before the Ottawa agreements set in 
place preferential trade policies within the Empire (see Section I). The coefficient 
on bilateral Commonwealth membership was higher in the 1930s than in 1928, but 
4 Irwin (2012) provides an excellent survey of the literature. 
5 Madsen (2001) finds sizable effects for protectionist policies in the context of panel regressions where 
the dependent variable is individual countries’ aggregate imports and exports. He also uses the average 
 tariff, and interprets the time dummies he estimates as representing the impact on trade of non-tariff barriers. 
Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003) estimate a gravity model, using aggregate data on bilateral trade flows, 
tariffs, and other variables for 1913, 1928, and 1938. Their bilateral tariff measure for countries  i and  j is simply 
 ln (1 +  t i ) + ln (1 +  t j ) , where  t i and  t j are once again the two countries’ average tariff rates. They therefore cannot 
account for discriminatory trade policies or non-tariff barriers to trade. Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor find a 
large and negative, but often statistically insignificant, tariff effect. Their results suggest that trade in the 1930s 
would have been around 50 percent higher had 1913 tariffs continued to apply, but they do not calculate the share 
of the Great Depression trade collapse that was due to the increase in tariffs after 1929. 
6 See, for example, Dimsdale and Horsewood (1995) and Horsewood, Sen, and Voicu (2010), whose measure 
of tariffs is simply a dummy variable which switches on in 1932. 
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not greatly so. Eichengreen and Irwin conclude that “the tendency toward regional-
ization commonly ascribed to the formation of trade and currency blocs was already 
evident prior to the regional policy initiatives of the 1930s; to a considerable extent 
it is attributable to ongoing historical forces such as commercial and financial link-
ages between countries forged over many years” (p. 21).
Subsequent literature has largely reinforced this view. Wolf and Ritschl (2011) 
emphasize the fact that trade blocs, as well as the currency blocs that are the major 
focus of their paper, are endogenous; controlling for a bloc fixed effect, they find 
that the formation of the Ottawa trade bloc had no additional impact on trade flows 
between members.7 Gowa and Hicks (2013, p. 440), who use a much larger dataset 
on aggregate trade flows than the previous two studies, also conclude that “blocs 
made much less difference to trade than commonly assumed.” They do find that 
the British Imperial Preference System is a partial exception to this general rule, 
in that while it had no impact on trade between British Dominions, it increased 
trade between the United Kingdom and the Dominions. (However, their analysis 
is potentially subject to the aforementioned objection that bloc membership was 
not randomly assigned across countries.) Surveying the literature, Irwin (2012, p. 
141) concludes that “while discriminatory policies succeeded in shifting the pattern 
of trade, they may have been less important than might appear to be the case from 
table 3.2” (his  version of Table 1).
What We Do.—Previous papers have thus related aggregate trade flows (either 
country-specific total imports and exports, or bilateral trade flows) to  average 
 measures of protection, notably the average tariff,8 or to dummy  variables 
 indicating whether both countries were members of the same trade bloc. However, 
tariffs  varied greatly across commodities during this period, while quotas became 
extremely important during the 1930s, and by definition were applied to imports 
of particular  commodities. In addition, countries such as the United Kingdom 
 pursued  explicitly  discriminatory trade policies. We therefore study the impact of 
the trade  policies  pursued by one country, the United Kingdom, in granular detail, 
using  information on imports,  tariffs, and non-tariff barriers to trade, all of which 
vary at the  commodity-country-year level. Rather than looking at whether trade 
blocs existed or not, we look at what one key member of one trade bloc actually 
did, and at what the effects of its policies were.
We digitized data on imports into the United Kingdom of 847 products from 
42 countries between 1924 and 1938. These were then aggregated up, allowing 
us to construct an import database for 258 product categories that are consistently 
defined over time. We also collected bilateral, commodity, and  country-specific 
data on tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade for the same countries, products, 
and years. The result is a dataset with 162,540 potential observations (imports of 
258   commodities  coming from 42 countries in 15 years), although the value of 
many of these is of course 0.9
7 They use the same aggregate trade data as Eichengreen and Irwin (1995). 
8 For a critique of this measure, see Anderson and Neary (1996). 
9 87 percent of all observations are 0; the share ranges from 85 to 90 percent in individual years. 
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We then estimate three types of elasticities: elasticities of substitution between 
different varieties of the same imported good; the elasticity of substitution between 
different imported goods; and the elasticity of substitution between imported goods 
and domestic output. Armed with these elasticities, we use computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models to  calculate counterfactual “constant trade policy” equi-
libria for individual years in the 1930s, which can be compared with the actual trade 
data. In order to focus on the impact of the shift in trade policy which occurred 
in the United Kingdom from 1931 onward, our  counterfactuals assume that ad 
valorem tariff rates and quotas were held at their 1930 levels between 1931 and 
1938.10 The models we use to calculate these  counterfactual equilibria are straight-
forward: on the demand side we assume nested utility functions as in Broda and 
Weinstein (2006), while on the supply side a single production sector transforms 
the sole factor of production into  domestically consumed output and exports via a 
constant elasticity of transformation (CET) production function.11 By comparing 
actual imports with counterfactual “constant trade policy” imports, we obtain esti-
mates of the impact of post-1930 protection on both the total value of UK imports, 
and the share of those imports coming from the British Empire.
We find that while the increase in protection lowered UK imports, it only 
accounted for around one-quarter of the decline experienced between 1929 and 
1933. In contrast, we also find that the majority of the increase in the Empire’s 
share of UK imports can be attributed to trade policy. Our mean estimates sug-
gest that trade policy accounted for over 70 percent of the increase between 1930 
and 1933. While our results are consistent with the views of Irwin regarding the 
relative importance of trade frictions in explaining the Great Depression trade 
collapse, they are also a vindication of traditional historical accounts which argue 
that the increasingly  bilateral nature of interwar trade was largely due to govern-
ment  policies. When it came to the geographical pattern of trade, British trade 
policy mattered, a lot, during the 1930s.
Section  I describes the dramatic shift in British trade policy which occurred 
between 1931 and 1933. The subsequent section describes our dataset. Section III 
 outlines our theoretical framework, while Section  IV derives the key trade 
 elasticities embedded in our model. Section V estimates the impact of British trade 
policies on the value and composition of British imports, and Section VI concludes.
10 There were no quotas in 1930. The United Kingdom imposed both specific and ad valorem tariffs during 
this period. In 1928, before the switch to protection, of the 474 items for which we collected tariff information 
(that were then matched onto our 258 goods) 410 were duty-free, 16 faced ad valorem tariffs, and 48 faced specific 
tariffs. By 1935, of the 475 items for which we have tariff information, just 86 were exempt, while 269 faced ad 
valorem tariffs, 62 faced specific tariffs, and 58 product categories (mostly in iron and steel) faced a mixture of spe-
cific and ad valorem rates. The overwhelming majority of tariffs introduced after the switch to protection were thus 
ad valorem. By holding ad valorem tariff rates fixed in our counterfactual analysis, we are computing the effects 
of all increases in protection post-1930, including those due to the interaction between price deflation and specific 
tariffs. See Crucini (1994) and Irwin (1998a) on the US experience. 
11 The model is thus similar to that used by Anderson and Neary (1996) to calculate their Trade Restrictiveness 
Index, and like theirs it can be calibrated using information on just GDP and imports. It is simpler in that it only 
includes one, domestic input into production; it is more complicated in that there is a three-tier nesting structure on 
the demand side, to take account of the fact that trade policies varied not only by good but also by country. 
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I. British Interwar Trade Policy
The United Kingdom moved decisively toward free trade from the mid-nineteenth 
 century onward. Tariffs were retained for revenue-raising purposes, on goods that 
were  subject to domestic excise duties (notably alcoholic drinks) or that were not 
 produced at all domestically (notably tea and tobacco). Tobacco, tea, spirits, and wine 
accounted for more than 95 percent of British tariff revenue in 1880: Irwin describes 
British tariffs during the period as “the natural extension of domestic excise taxes 
to  foreign goods” (Irwin 1993, p. 147). “Fiscal” or “revenue” tariffs on inelastical-
ly-demanded goods such as tea, coffee, cocoa, sugar, and tobacco were an important 
source of government revenue in many other European countries during the period as 
well (Tena-Junguito 2006): a sugar tariff was reintroduced in the United Kingdom in 
1901 due to the fiscal pressures created by war in South Africa (Rutter 1902).
Conservatives traditionally represented agricultural interests and many opposed 
the shift to free trade. Many late nineteenth century Conservatives advocated both 
 imperialism and tariffs. In 1903, the former Colonial Secretary and convinced 
 imperialist Joseph Chamberlain launched a campaign for “Tariff Reform”: he sought 
tariffs which would both protect British industries against supposedly unfair foreign 
competition, and allow the United Kingdom to offer trade preferences to her Empire 
(something which her unilateral free trade policy made impossible). The hope, both 
then and later, was that an Imperial trade bloc would be better able to compete with 
great powers such as Germany and the United States, and be more self-sufficient, 
seen as advantageous in the event of war. The campaign ended when the pro-free-
trade Liberals decisively won the 1906 general election.
Britain’s long-standing free trade policy was abandoned during World War  I, 
and free trade did not resume in 1918. The 1915 McKenna Duty imposed a 33  and 
one-third percent ad valorem tariff on cars, clocks and watches, films, and musical 
instruments, and was retained after the war. The 1921 Safeguarding of Industries 
Act introduced not only anti-dumping duties but tariffs, again usually 33 and one-
third percent ad valorem, on imports of “key” goods considered to be essential for 
national security ( including some  chemicals, optical glass, magnets, and tungsten) 
(Gordon 1941).12 New revenue duties on silk and petroleum were introduced in 
1925 and 1928, respectively (National Institute of Economic and Social Research 
1943). In 1926, pork imports from the European Continent were embargoed on vet-
erinary grounds (Ashby and Jones 1938b, p. 225).
There was a modest degree of Imperial Preference during this period: revenue 
duties were one-sixth lower on goods produced in the Empire, McKenna duties were 
one-third lower, “key” goods from the Empire were exempt from the 1921 duties, 
and safeguarding duties were also lower on Imperial products (Richardson 1936, 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research 1943).13
Notwithstanding these departures from nineteenth century practice, British 
trade policy remained predominantly liberal until 1930. The change that occurred 
12 The Act also allowed industries to apply to the Board of Trade for “safeguarding” protection, although there 
were strict conditions attached and few industries benefited from this provision. 
13 The 1927 Cinematograph Films Act included minimum quotas for British (or British Empire) films 
(Plant et al. 1939, Miskell 2005).
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in 1931 and 1932 was therefore all the more dramatic. As elsewhere, the Great 
Depression increased the demand for protection in the United Kingdom: in 
October 1931 a new “national  government” was elected, dominated by protec-
tionist Conservative politicians. Joseph Chamberlain’s son Neville was appointed 
Chancellor of the Exchequer on November 5, and later that month the Abnormal 
Importations Act was  introduced. This allowed the Board of Trade to impose 
 tariffs of up to 100  percent ad valorem on manufactured goods from outside the 
Empire, and tariffs of 50 percent were immediately imposed on many of these. 
The Horticultural Products (Emergency Duties) Act soon followed, allowing the 
Minister of Agriculture to impose similar duties on non-Empire fruit, flowers, and 
vegetables.
In February 1932 an Import Duties Act imposed a general 10 percent tariff on 
goods not already subject to duties, though some important primary imports were 
exempted. These included not only raw materials such as raw cotton, raw wool, 
hides and skins, iron ore, and scrap iron, but also tea, animals, and  foodstuffs 
such as meat and wheat. Goods from British colonies were exempted, while 
imports from the self-governing Dominions were temporarily exempted pending 
the  outcome of the next Imperial Economic Conference, due to begin in Ottawa 
in July.14 The 10 percent general tariff was a minimum tariff, in the sense that a 
new Import Duties Advisory Committee (IDAC) could impose additional duties.15 
They did so beginning in April and continued to do so subsequently, with Imperial 
goods generally being exempted.
The Ottawa conference opened on July 21, and negotiations continued for roughly 
a month. The Dominions’ aim was to secure and if possible to improve their margin 
of preference for goods where preference had already been secured; and to estab-
lish a margin of Imperial Preference in markets for goods, such as meat and wheat, 
which were still admitted duty-free into the British market, and were of particular 
importance to them. The British wished to improve their access to Dominion mar-
kets, and retain a margin for maneuverer when it came to potential future trade 
agreements with foreign countries.
The outcome was a series of bilateral trade agreements between the participants, 
the UK signing agreements with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, 
Newfoundland, India, and Southern Rhodesia.16 In broad terms, Britain agreed to 
maintain or raise tariffs imposed on foreign imports under the terms of the 1932 
Import Duties Act, and not to reduce the 10 percent ad valorem tariff without the 
consent of the Dominions; to continue to exempt Empire products from these  tariffs; 
and to introduce or enhance Imperial Preference on a wide range of agricultural 
 commodities and raw materials of special interest to the Dominions, by raising duties 
or protecting goods that had previously been duty free such as wheat (Drummond 
1974, pp. 266–68).
14 Imperial conferences regularly brought together representatives of the British Dominions and India. Previous 
postwar meetings had been held in 1921, 1923, 1926, and 1930. 
15 The IDAC had to consult with the Board of Trade, and its decisions had to be sanctioned by the Treasury and 
Parliament (National Institute of Economic and Social Research 1943). 
16 Good accounts of the Ottawa negotiations and the eventual agreements are to be found inter alia in Drummond 
(1974), Gordon (1941), Richardson (1936), Richardson (1938), and Rooth (1993), on whom this account draws. 
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Quotas were introduced for several agricultural commodities, on the basis that 
policy needed to serve the interests of “the home producer first, Empire  producers 
second, and foreign producers last” (Richardson 1936, p. 138). Imports from 
 foreign countries of frozen mutton and lamb, and frozen and chilled beef, were to be 
 subject to quotas from January 1, 1933 (with total quantities reduced by 10 percent 
in the first year and 35 percent from 1934 to 1937, and then slightly increased), 
while Australia and New Zealand agreed to voluntarily restrain their exports to a 
certain extent.17
A report issued soon after the passage of the 1932 Import Duties Act on the 
future of the British pig industry recommended that imports of bacon and ham also 
be  regulated, and quantitative restrictions came into force during 1932: first via 
 voluntary export restraint agreements with the 11 major supplying countries, nota-
bly Denmark, and from December 1933 onward via quotas (Murphy 1957, Cohen 
1934, Plant et  al. 1939). These restrictions were only enforced for non-Empire 
countries.18
There were several other commodity-specific schemes introduced during the next 
few years following the introduction of the Agricultural Marketing Acts of 1931 
and 1933.19 The 1933 Act permitted the regulation of imports, and this was done 
in some cases (hops, potatoes, and cured pork).20 In 1935, imports of frozen and 
chilled pork became subject to quantitative controls under the terms of the Pork 
(Import Regulation) Order of 1935, based on the 1933 Agricultural Marketing 
Act ( quotas in the case of foreign countries, and voluntary export restraints in the 
case of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand).21 Imports of fish became subject 
to  quantitative  restrictions under the terms of the 1933 Sea Fishing Industry Act 
(Plant et  al. 1939). There was some “voluntary” restriction of dairy  products by 
some exporters “with the shadow of the 1933 Act behind them” (Sorenson and 
Cassels 1936, p. 277).22
From 1933 onward there was a series of trade agreements with various  foreign 
countries, notably the Scandinavian countries and Argentina. These typically 
secured trade concessions for Britain in return for her not worsening the positions 
of these countries any further in the British market. In most cases agreements also 
included clauses regarding specific goods, in order to ensure that Britain would 
not discriminate in the future against important treaty partner export commodities. 
These clauses generally remained ineffective since Britain did not greatly extend its 
quota and tariff system after 1932–1933.
17 Both agreed to restrain their 1933 exports of frozen mutton and lamb to the level prevailing in the 
pre vious year, while New Zealand “estimated” that its frozen beef exports would increase by no more than around 
10  percent. Initially not subject to the restrictions, imports of beef offal soon became subject to the beef quota 
 system, so as to combat evasion of the quotas (National Institute of Economic and Social Research 1943). 
18 An agreement with Canada in 1932 fixed a limit of 2.5 million cwt per year, but the limit never became 
 binding, since Canadian exports to Britain remained below that quantity. Due to the Anglo-Irish trade war 
 substantial duties were imposed on Irish bacon between 1932 and 1938 (National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research 1943). 
19 There were actually two such Acts in 1933, although the second introduced “only minor modifications” 
(Cohen 1934). 
20 On hops and potatoes, which are not in our sample, see National Institute of Economic and Social Research 
(1943) and Wheeler (1937). 
21 Ashby and Jones (1938b), National Institute of Economic and Social Research (1943). 
22 The items concerned included condensed milk (whole and skimmed), milk powder, and cream (Ashby and 
Jones 1938a). 
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Imports were sometimes blocked for political reasons. Britain participated in the 
ill-fated League of Nations sanctions campaign against Italy, as a result of which 
imports from that country were banned between November 1935 and June 1936 
(Ristuccia 2000). Mention should also be made of the Anglo-Irish trade war which 
began in 1932, and which led to the imposition of emergency duties on imports of 
Irish agricultural commodities, notably cattle; duties were reduced in 1934, and the 
dispute ended in 1938 on terms highly favorable to the Irish (O’Rourke 1991).23
II. Data
Our source was the Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom (Statistical 
Office, H. M. Customs and Excise Department 1929, 1935, 1939). The basic problem 
with historical trade data is that the trade classifications used by national authorities 
are consistent neither across countries nor over time. We collected import values for 
847 individual product categories from 42 countries between 1924 and 1938.24 We 
had to exclude 35 of these items because of a variety of data problems, which left a 
total of 812 products, not all of which were reported in each year because of clas-
sification changes. However, we were able to aggregate these 812 items to produce 
import data for 258 product categories which are consistently defined over time. For 
example, our good number 255, “Wool. Raw. Sheep’s and lambs’ wool,” was con-
structed using data for 24 separate items that appear in the trade statistics between 
1924 and 1938.25
As Figure 1 indicates, our sample tracks aggregate UK imports faithfully over 
time. The size of our sample, relative to the total value of UK trade, reflects above 
all the share of our 258 commodities in total trade (see online Appendix 1 for 
details of how those 258 goods were chosen): our 42 countries accounted for 
the bulk of UK imports. On average, our 258 commodity sample accounts for 
about 58  percent of British imports during the period, while imports of these 
258  commodities from our 42  country sample account for roughly 51  percent. 
Figure  2 shows that the sample does a good job of tracking the British 
Empire’s share of UK imports over time. Online Appendix Table  6 shows that 
our sample roughly matches the aggregate data in terms of its percentage break-
down between 4 broad categories: agricultural products such as wheat or meat; 
 manufactured goods such as copper or machinery; raw materials such as coal, 
 fertilizers, raw  cotton, or  oilseeds; and goods on which revenue tariffs were lev-
23 In our econometric specifications we will also control for various cartel agreements that restricted imports, 
albeit as a result of private sector rather than government decisions. The best known of these cartels is the European 
Steel Cartel, which British iron and steel manufacturers joined in 1935. As a result of Britain’s joining the cartel, iron 
and steel imports were limited, although cartel members benefited in that they did not have to pay the higher tariffs 
imposed on the exports of non-cartel members (Richardson 1938, Benham 1941). Details of the cartels in operation 
during this period, of relevance to our sample of commodities, are given in online Appendix 5. 
24 For 3 of these countries (Spain, Malaysia, and the Dutch East Indies), we had to type in data for a total of 
10 subregions, implying that we entered data for a total of 49 countries or subregions. In addition, imports from 
Burma were shown separately from 1937, and had to be added to imports from British India so as to produce 
 consistent series. Online Appendix 3 lists the countries in our sample. 
25 In turn, these 258 product categories can if desired be aggregated up to provide data for 38 consistently 
defined 3-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) categories. (Full details are provided in online 
Appendix 1.) 
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ied.26 Online Appendix Sections  1 and  3 list the top commodities and trading 
partners in our sample.
Following Broda and Weinstein (2006), we will refer in what follows to each 
of our 258 product categories as a good, and to imports of each of these goods 
from a particular country as a variety. Unfortunately, successive volumes of the 
British trade statistics seem to have differed in the extent to which they separated 
26 Full details of this four-category classification are provided in online Appendix 1. We are slightly under-sam-
pling manufactured imports, and to a lesser extent raw materials, and over-sampling revenue imports. This is 
because imports of manufactures are extremely heterogeneous, and disaggregated into a large number of individual 
items in the trade statistics. This is also the case for some raw materials (e.g., there are many varieties of medicinal 
plants and chemical substances). On the other hand, revenue goods are rather concentrated. 
Figure 1. Total and Sample UK Imports, 1924 –1938
Source: Statistical Office, H.M. Customs and Excise Department (1929, 1935, 1939)
Figure 2. Total and Sample Empire Share of UK Imports, 1924 –1938
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out imports of particular goods from marginal suppliers; over time they seem to 
have  increasingly lumped these into the “other countries” category. This makes 
it  impossible to  replicate Broda and Weinstein’s analysis of the evolution of the 
 intensive and extensive margins. The number of goods imported into the United 
Kingdom from our 42 countries diminished over time: from 255–258 in 1924 –1928, 
to 245–247 in 1929–1932, to 236 or 237 in 1934 –1938. Again, these successive 
declines  correspond with  successive volumes of the trade statistics.
Nonetheless, it seems that the intensive margin accounted for essentially all 
of the trade collapse and subsequent recovery. For example, take the volume of 
trade  statistics covering the years 1929–1933: within this volume, the reporting of 
 countries and goods was consistent over time. The number of varieties imported 
into the UK was 1,338 in 1929, 1,354 in 1930, 1,339 in 1931, 1,319 in 1932, and 
1,298 in 1933. The total number of varieties imported thus fell by only 3 percent 
between 1929 and 1933.27 More systematically, we can decompose the decline 
in UK imports between 1929 and 1933 in the manner of Kehoe and Ruhl (2013, 
p. 380). When we compute the log change of the total imports of those varieties 
that are traded in both years, which we take to be the intensive margin, and compare 
this with the log change in the total value of all imports, we find that the intensive 
margin can account for the entire decline in trade. When we repeat the exercise for 
1929–1936, we find that the intensive margin can still account for 99.4 percent of 
the decline in trade, despite the classification problems associated with moving 
across volumes. Our modeling strategy will thus focus on the intensive margin.
Tariff information was also reported in the Annual Statement, but in a different 
table from the trade data, and unfortunately not at as disaggregated a level as the 
847-product import data. Additional information on rates of duty and exemptions 
was obtained from schedules included in National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research (1943) and H. M. Customs and Excise (1933, 1938). Some matching of 
tariff rates to individual products was required, which was done at the closest level 
possible to the import data. For example, tariff information was given for “cotton 
linters and cotton waste.” This rate was applied to all individual series covered by this 
category (e.g., cotton linters, bleached) unless a specific exemption was identified.
To calculate ad valorem tariff rates, two approaches were implemented. Where 
possible, the tariff rate was calculated as the total amount of duty raised, divided by 
the value28 of goods charged with duty as recorded in the Annual Statement. In the 
small number of cases where the rate could not be determined by this method, it was 
calculated as the specific duty rate divided by the unit value (import value divided 
by import quantity).
Quantitative restrictions, including the veterinary embargoes from 1926 and the 
ban on imports from Italy in 1935–1936, 29 were coded based on National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research (1943). We also used this source to code volun-
tary export restraints, alongside the more detailed sources given in Section I. In all 
cases quantitative restrictions were coded simply as dummy variables, indicating 
27 In the 1924 –1928 volume, the number of varieties ranged from 1,605 to 1,645; in the 1934 –1938 
volume, it ranged from 1,107 to 1,127. 
28 Or the quantity subject to duty multiplied by the average price. 
29 Except for gold, silver, bullion, books, magazines, and newspapers. 
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whether a particular restriction affected imports of a particular good from a particu-
lar country in a particular year. Details are given in online Appendix 4.
As mentioned in Section I, Britain signed a number of trade treaties with  countries 
such as Argentina and Denmark. We therefore coded two variables  relating to these 
treaties. The first simply indicates whether a trade treaty had been signed and was in 
force between the United Kingdom and the country concerned in a  particular year 
(it thus  varies across countries and years, but not across  commodities). The  second 
 indicates whether such a treaty explicitly mentioned a commodity, imports of which 
from that country were subject to British quota restrictions in that year. It therefore 
 varies across countries, years, and commodities, and is designed to test whether trea-
ties muted the impact of quotas on imports. Full details of these two variables, and 
the sources used to code them, are given in online Appendix 6.
In our regressions we also control for exchange rates and nominal GDP. Nominal 
exchange rates were calculated as annual averages of closing daily exchange rates, 
and were taken from Global Financial Data.30 Nominal GDP was taken from 
Klasing and Milionis (2014), adjusted for interwar borders using the adjustment 
coefficients from Broadberry and Klein (2012).31 Online Appendix  2 provides 
 summary  statistics for all variables.
III. Theoretical Framework
As Broda and Weinstein (2006) (whose notation we largely use) and others do, 
we consider a representative agent with a nested constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES) utility function (see Figure 3). At the top level, utility in period  t ,  U t , 
depends on the consumption of a domestic good  D t , and of an aggregate imported 
good  M t ,
(1)  U t =  ( α Dt  D t (κ−1)/κ + (1 −  α Dt )  M t (κ−1)/κ ) κ/(κ−1) ,
where  κ is the elasticity of substitution between the 2 goods.
At the second level, the aggregate imported good is defined as being a CES 
 composite of imported goods  g ∈  G t where  G t is the set of all goods imported in 
period  t ,
(2)  M t =   ( ∑ g∈ G t   α gt  M gt (γ−1)/γ ) 
γ/(γ−1) .
Here,  γ is the elasticity of substitution between imported goods, while  M gt rep-
resents total imports of good  g in year  t .
30 https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/index.html (accessed June 2013). 
31 Because we lacked GDP data for Cuba, the Dutch West Indies, and Luxembourg, as well as for Austria 
and Czechoslovakia in 1938, we had to drop these observations from our regressions, leaving us with 150,414 
 observations with which to estimate elasticities. However, imports from all five countries in all years were taken 
account of in the CGE analysis. 
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Finally,  M gt is defined as an Armington aggregate of imports of good  g from 
 different countries  c , each of which (following Broda and Weinstein) we refer to as 
a variety:
(3)  M gt =  (  ∑ c∈ I gt   β gct  m   gct  ( σ g −1)/ σ g  ) 
 σ g /( σ g −1) .
Here  m gct represents imports of good  g from country  c in year  t ;  I gt ⊂ C is the sub-
set of all countries  C supplying good  g to the United Kingdom in year  t ; the  β gct s are 
taste parameters; and  σ g is the Armington elasticity of substitution between different 
 varieties of good  g . For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that  I gt (and also  G t  ) is 
fixed  ∀ g, t : we are therefore holding the extensive margin of trade fixed. This should 
not greatly influence our results, given that, as Section II showed, Britain’s trade col-
lapse and subsequent recovery occurred almost entirely along the intensive margin.
On the supply side we adopt a simplified version of the model suggested by 
Anderson and Neary (1996). The economy is endowed with just one factor of 
 production labeled  GDP t . This is transformed into two goods, an export good  X t 
and the domestic good  D t , via a constant elasticity of transformation production 
function:
(4)  GDP t =  ( α D  D t (1+η )/η +  (1 −  α D )  X t (1+η )/η ) η/(1+η) ,














Figure 3. Nested Utility Function
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where  η is the elasticity of transformation between the two outputs, and  α D is the 
benchmark share of domestic good production in GDP. We assume that the United 
Kingdom takes world import prices, inclusive of non-policy-related transport costs, 
p gct W , as given.32 Domestic prices are then given by
(5)  p gct D =  τ gct ×  p gct W ,
where  ( τ gct − 1) is the ad valorem policy-related trade cost (that is to say, costs 
associated with tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade) applying to imports of good  g 
from country  c in year  t . Let these policy-related trade costs be defined as follows:
(6)  τ gct =   (  ∏ i=1
n
  b i  δ igct  ) ×  (1 +  t gct ) ,
where  b i − 1 is the ad valorem equivalent of facing non-tariff barrier  i ;  δ igct is an 
indicator variable taking the value 1 if imports of good  g from country  c face barrier 
i in year  t , and 0 otherwise; and  t gct is the ad valorem tariff imposed on imports of 
good  g from country  c in year  t .
Given domestic prices  p gct D , it is straightforward to derive prices of the Armington 
aggregates  M gt ,  p  M gt  , and of the composite aggregate imported good  M t ,  p  M t  . The 
representative agent is endowed with  GDP t and receives all tariff revenue, as well 
as any rents associated with non-tariff barriers to trade (i.e., quota rents). He/she 
maximizes utility given by equation (1) subject to the usual budget constraint, while 
producers maximize  p  D t   D t +  p  X t   X t subject to (4).33
When solving the CGE model, it is convenient to define units so that all 
domestic prices are initially 1, implying that world prices are equal to  1 / τ gct . Given 
data on  τ gct ,  m gct , and  GDP t , all remaining parameters in the model (in  particular 
the  β gct s,  α gt s,  α Dt , and  α D ) can be pinned down, and the general equilibrium for 
the  economy solved. For example, this can be done for a year when protection was 
in place, say 1935. We can then compute counterfactual equilibria. For example, 
we could set  τ gc1935 =  τ gc1930 ∀ g, c and  δ gc1935 =  δ gc1930 ∀ g, c , and compute the 
counterfactual equilibrium that would have obtained in 1935, had protection been 
the same in 1935 as in 1930. Comparing that counterfactual 1935 equilibrium with 
32 This amounts to assuming that the United Kingdom did not have sufficient market power to influence world 
prices. McCloskey (1980) argues that mid-nineteenth century Britain had sufficient market power that it could have 
levied an optimal tariff, and Irwin (1988) finds evidence of less than perfectly elastic import and export supply and 
demand elasticities, based on data for 1820 –1846. Nye (1991) finds that while British demand for French exports 
was inelastic prior to 1850, the elasticity increased steadily as the nineteenth century progressed. Authors concur 
that as the industrial revolution spread around the world, and Britain’s share of world trade fell, it steadily lost mar-
ket power: while the United Kingdom accounted for 24 percent of world imports in 1850, this share had dropped to 
16 percent in 1913. It rose during the war but then resumed its decline, standing at 17 percent in 1924 and 15 per-
cent in 1928. The United Kingdom’s share of world exports was lower: 13 percent in 1924 and 11 percent in 1928 
(Federico and Tena-Junguito 2016). McCloskey (1980, p. 318) writes that “In the 1930s Britain herself finally did 
abandon free trade, but by then, alas, the dominant position that would have enabled her over the preceding century 
to exploit the rest of the world was gone”; Harley (2004, p. 202) that “Paradoxically, protection began to recover 
its political appeal only at the end of the century, when potential monopoly was gone forever.” de Bromhead et al. 
(forthcoming) find that the prices of UK imports from the Empire and the rest of the world fell by very similar 
amounts between 1931 and 1933, despite the fact that foreign imports were subject to higher tariffs than goods from 
the Empire. This suggests that our  assumption is not unreasonable. 
33 We let  X t be the numéraire good, and set its price  p  X t  equal to 1. 
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the actual one would then give us an estimate of the impact of the post-1930 trade 
policy shift in 1935.
We are interested in two questions: the impact of protectionism on total UK 
imports; and the impact of protectionism on the share of imports coming from the 
Empire. Given our nested CES demand structure, the only elasticities that matter for 
the latter question are  σ g and  γ . These also matter for the total level of imports, but 
so do  κ and  η . The next section discusses how we estimated the various elasticities 
in our model.
IV. Estimating the Elasticities
Since most of our elasticities are estimated econometrically, we want to take 
account of the fact that they are imprecisely measured. We thus perform  systematic 
sensitivity analysis, as described by Hillberry and Hummels (2013). We repeatedly 
draw elasticity values from normal distributions, whose means are the point esti-
mates of the elasticity in question, and whose standard deviations are the standard 
errors of the elasticity coefficient. In what follows, we are therefore  interested in 
both the point estimates of the elasticities, and the standard errors.
A. Estimating the  σ g s
In order to estimate the  σ g s in equation (3), we begin with the structural gravity 
equations (4)–(6) presented in Anderson and Yotov (2010), bearing in mind that 
in all cases the destination country is the United Kingdom. Using our  notation, 
their equation (4) becomes (for each of our 258 goods  g , 42 countries  c , and 
15 years  t ):
(7)  V gct D =   M gt ×  Y gct  _ Y gt  ×  ( 
 τ gct  _  P gt ×  Π gct ) 
1− σ g  ,
where  V gct D =  p gct D ×  m gct =  τ gct ×  p gct W ×  m gct is the value of imports of good  g 
from country  c in year  t , measured in domestic (UK) prices;  Y gct is the output of 
good  g in country  c in year  t ;  Y gt is world output of good  g in year t;  P gt is the inward 
multilateral resistance term for good  g in the United Kingdom in year  t ; and  Π gct is 
the outward multilateral resistance term for good  g in country  c in year  t .
As is usual, our import data are c.i.f., and valued at world prices inclusive of 
transport and other trade costs not related to British trade barriers (in terms of the 
notation above, they are equal to  p gct W ×  m gct ). We are not interested in these other 
trade costs, since we are holding them fixed in our analysis, and focusing instead on 
variations in trade-policy-related trade costs  τ gct . We follow Baier, Kerr, and Yotov (2018) and work with
(8)  V gct W =  p gct W ×  m gct =  V gct D / τ gct =   M gt ×  Y gct  _ Y gt  ×  τ 
− σ g  ×  ( 1 _  P gt ×  Π gt ) 
1− σ g  .
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Substituting (6) into (8), and taking logs, we obtain
(9)  ln ( V gct W ) = ln ( M gt ) + ln ( Y gct ) − ln ( Y gt ) −  σ g ln (1 +  t gct ) 
 −  σ g  ∑ 
i=1
n
 ln ( b i )  δ igct −  (1 −  σ g ) ln ( P gt ) −  (1 −  σ g ) ln ( Π gct ) +  u gct ,
where  u gct is the error term. Good times year fixed effects can be used to control 
for  M gt ,  Y gt , and  P gt . Intuitively, by controlling in this manner for total imports of 
a given good in a given year (e.g., wheat in 1933), we are focusing on the choice 
between, say, Canadian and Argentinian wheat in 1933, which is what we want to do 
in order to estimate  σ g . Since we do not have data on foreign outputs of  individual 
 commodities, we are forced to use GDP instead (so we replace  Y gct with  GDP ct in 
equation (9)). We also control for the bilateral exchange rate,  E ct . Finally, since 
we only have data for one country, the United Kingdom, we are unable to include 
 time-varying outward multilateral resistance terms. We therefore include good 
times country (i.e., variety) fixed effects, in the place of  Π gct . It is important to 
include these, since without  variety fixed effects our estimated elasticities might be 
 contaminated by any long run cross-variety correlation between average imports 
and average tariff rates. In particular, some of the United Kingdom’s most important 
imports during this period (such as tobacco, silk, and petroleum) were inelastically 
demanded goods subject to very high revenue tariffs, especially on non-Empire 
goods. Not including variety fixed effects might lead to a spurious positive cor-
relation between trade and tariffs. By including them we ensure that identification 
occurs along the time dimension alone.34
In principle we should estimate equation (9) for each of our 258 goods 
g , in which case the good times country, and good times year, fixed effects 
would  collapse into country and year fixed effects. However, we lack  sufficient 
 observations to do this. We therefore estimate across nine categories of goods 
h , assuming a  common  elasticity  σ h for all goods  g within this category (i.e.,  σ g =  σ h ∀ g ∈ h ). The nine categories are grain, animal products, 
 machinery, minerals, textiles,  miscellaneous inputs, miscellaneous industry, 
food oils, and colonial goods.35
Our estimating equation is thus
(10)  ln (  V gct W ) = ln ( GDP c t ) + ln (  E ct ) −  σ h ln (1 +  t gct ) 
 −  σ h  ∑ 
i=1
n
 ln (  b i )  δ igct +  d gt +  d gc +  u gct ,
34 In online Appendix 7 we try an alternative specification in which we replace good times country (i.e., vari-
ety) fixed effects with 3-digit-SITC times country times year fixed effects. In other words, rather than including 
good times  country fixed effects  d gc as in our baseline equation (10), or good times country times year fixed 
effects  d gct , as we should in principle but cannot, we include  d sct , where  s is the 3-digit SITC category (recall that we 
have 38 of these in our data) to which good  g belongs. Once the small number of revenue goods in our sample have 
been  eliminated the estimated elasticities look quite similar to our baseline results. Whether they are eliminated or 
not, our results regarding the impact of protection on the value and composition of trade are unchanged. 
35 Online Appendix 1 gives full details of how each category was constructed. 
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where good  g is a member of goods category  h ; and where  d gt and  d gc represent 
good times year, and good times country, fixed effects. We follow Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006), and use a Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator 
to estimate (10). Since our 9  regressions include a total of both  258 × 42 = 10,836 
good times country fixed effects, and  258 × 15 = 3,870 good times year fixed 
effects, we estimate the  equations using the poi2hdfe estimator available in Stata 
(Guimarães and Portugal 2010; Figueiredo, Guimarães, and Woodward 2015).36
A potential concern might be that tariffs rose disproportionately on goods whose 
imports rose more, or fell less, during the preceding period. If rising imports prior 
to 1931 were for some reason correlated with import trends after 1931, our esti-
mated trade elasticities would be biased. Online Appendix Table 14 shows that 
this is not an issue: there was absolutely no correlation between import trends 
during 1928–31 and the change in tariff rates after 1931. Note also that the United 
Kingdom does not fit the argument in Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) according to 
which countries that stayed on the gold standard longer were more protectionist. 
Online Appendix 7 also establishes that our econometric and simulation results 
are robust to using OLS.37
The results, given in Table 2, seem reasonable.38 We control for the Italian trade 
sanctions of 1935–36, and the foot and mouth disease embargo instituted in 1926. 
Both had a severe negative impact on trade flows. Signing a trade treaty with the 
United Kingdom boosted exports of miscellaneous inputs and food oils to Britain, 
but  otherwise had no direct impact on trade. As mentioned in Section II, we also 
coded a  second variable relating to trade treaties: this was equal to 1 if a trade treaty 
that a  country signed with the United Kingdom mentioned a good which was sub-
ject to quotas at that time. Neither this variable, which is something like an interac-
tion effect between treaties and  quotas,39 nor a dummy indicating whether imports 
of commodities were subject to a voluntary export restraint, had any effect on trade 
flows.40 Cartel membership significantly lowered imports of “mineral” products; 
curiously, the cartel coefficient is positive for colonial goods.41
Our main interest is in the impact of British trade policy. All the elasticities 
of trade with respect to tariffs are negative and (with one exception) statistically 
 significant.42 The fact that the elasticity is so low for colonial goods subject to 
 revenue tariffs makes sense, as is the fact that the food oils and grain elasticities 
are so high. The coefficient on the animal tariff variable ( − σ g ) and on the quota 
36 Our standard errors are clustered by country. We also experimented by clustering at the 
 commodity × year × Empire level, on the basis that this is the level at which trade policies varied. Those standard 
errors were generally smaller, and using them would not have affected our results. 
37 Another potential concern might be that changes in UK tariffs on particular goods could have been 
 correlated with changes in tariffs on the same goods elsewhere. In general equilibrium, this might impact exports 
of the affected goods to the United Kingdom. The fact that we are including good times year fixed effects should 
help to allay this concern. 
38 While the coefficients on GDP are all positive, and in many cases statistically indistinguishable from one, 
they are very small for animal products in particular. GDP is a poor proxy for a country’s output of a particular good, 
given that countries specialize in very different products. For example, 46 percent of animal product imports came 
from just two small countries, Denmark and New Zealand. 
39 Although it is separately coded, rather than being mechanically computed as an interaction effect, since not 
all treaties mentioned the same goods. 
40 The coefficients are correctly signed, but small and statistically insignificant. 
41 The cartel in question was the Chadbourne sugar agreement, which the United Kingdom joined in late 1937. 
42 One of the coefficients is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
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dummy variable in column  2 jointly imply (from equation (10)) that quotas on 
 animal products were equivalent to a 25.9 percent ad valorem tariff. We will use 
the point estimates and standard errors of the elasticities in the first row of Table 2 
when estimating our counterfactuals.
B. Estimating  γ 
When generating the baseline results presented in the body of the paper, we adopt 
the procedure outlined by Ottaviano and Peri (2012), and estimate  γ  econometrically 
via a two-step procedure. First, we estimate the  σ h s as before, using equation (10). 
The fact that equation (10) includes good times country (variety) fixed effects, 
rather than good times country times year fixed effects, is equivalent to assuming 
that the  β gct s in equation (3) are constant over time, i.e.,  β gct =  β gc ∀ t . It can be 
shown that the estimated fixed effects  d gc are equal to  σ g ln (  β gc ) , which allows us to 
recover the  β gc s. That in turn allows us to compute the CES quantity  ( M gt ) and price 
 (  p  M gt  ) nests for each of our 258 imported goods  g in all years, where the prices 
reflect the impact of both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. We then run the 
 following regression:
(11)  ln (  M gt ) = − γ ln (  p  M gt  /  p  M t  ) + θ ln (  I t ) +  d g +  u gt ,
Table 2—PPML Gravity Estimates by Category, 1924 –1938







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




Treaty 0.161 −0.0905 −0.0322 −0.253 −0.121 0.222 −0.0906 0.777 −0.799(0.263) (0.194) (0.0739) (0.328) (0.186) (0.108) (0.642) (0.293) (0.530)
Quota × treaty 0.234(0.216)
Cartel −0.123 −0.577 −0.0964 0.352(0.254) (0.347) (0.583) (0.131)
Italian sanctions −7.174 −2.435 −2.581 −21.43 −2.309 −3.952 −2.654 −3.526 −19.21(0.372) (0.172) (0.0700) (0.246) (0.227) (0.159) (0.233) (0.348) (0.418)
log(GDP) 1.287 0.106 0.996 1.508 1.766 0.620 0.953 0.429 1.590(0.794) (0.456) (0.309) (0.906) (0.373) (0.576) (0.765) (0.721) (0.709)
log(exchange rate) 0.135 0.103 0.132 0.352 0.103 0.0622 0.542 0.0755 0.492(0.367) (0.153) (0.167) (0.202) (0.257) (0.241) (0.684) (0.310) (0.354)
Observations 1,122 2,731 6,186 4,334 3,595 6,202 700 2,795 1,197
Notes: Dependent variable is the value of imports, by good, country, and year. Estimates control for good ×  country 
and good × year fixed effects. Estimates computed using poi2hdfe. Robust standard errors clustered by country in 
parentheses.
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where  p  M t  is an aggregate import price index,  I t is an import volume index, 
d g  represents 258 good-specific fixed effects,  u gt is the error term, and  γ is the 
 elasticity being estimated.43
The problem with this procedure is that the price and quantity nests in 
 equation  (11)  are  based on prior econometric estimates, and the standard errors 
ought to reflect this. We therefore adopted a bootstrapping procedure, each time 
drawing new subsamples of the raw data, estimating equation (10), extract-
ing the  σ h s and the fixed effects, estimating the CES quantity ( M gt  ) and price (  p  M gt   ) nests for each of our 258 imported goods, and finally estimating equation (11). 
This yielded a point estimate for  γ of 1.245, with a standard error of 0.117.44
As a robustness check, we also simply assumed that the middle-tier nest in our 
nested utility function was Cobb-Douglas, and that  γ was thus equal to 1 (with 
a corresponding standard error of zero). Doing so had no impact on our results, 
as online Appendix  7 shows. We acknowledge that we cannot convincingly rule 
out political-economy-related endogeneity concerns regarding our estimate of  γ . 
Reassuringly, online Appendix 7 shows that the precise value used has very little 
impact on our results.
C. Estimating  κ 
We also estimated  κ , the upper level elasticity of substitution between imports 
and domestic expenditure.
The most straightforward method was simply to run the OLS regression
(12)  ln (  m t ) =  α 0 ln (T E t ) +  α 1 ln (  E t ) − κ ln (1 +  t t ) +  u t ,
where  m t is the value of imports in year t,  T E t is total expenditure on both  domestic 
and imported goods,  E t is the real effective exchange rate,  u t is the error term, 
and  t t is  the unweighted average tariff estimated for our sample of goods.45 
Total  expenditure is the sum of net imports and expenditure on domestic goods. 
Expenditure on  domestic goods is calculated by taking Feinstein’s GDP data 
(Feinstein 1972, Table 9, p. T27), multiplying this by the ratio of gross output to 
value added in 1935 (derived from the input-output tables given in Barna 1952), and 
subtracting exports of domestic produce. Estimating (12) yielded a point  estimate 
for  κ of 2.294, with a standard error of 0.854. We also estimated  κ by using the 
same method as that adopted in Section IVB. Reassuringly, this yielded a  very 
43 Both the aggregate import price index, and the import volume index, were taken from Bank of England 
(2017). 
44 We performed 250 replications, of which 238 were successful. An alternative might be to estimate all 
 elasticities (including  κ ) simultaneously, using a generalized method of moments (GMM) approach. The benefit 
of proceeding in stages, as do Ottaviano and Peri (2012), is that their approach is easier to implement and more 
transparent: at each stage we have log-linear estimating equations that can be estimated in the usual fashion. Given 
that we are bootstrapping, so as to take account of how lower level regressions affect the standard errors of higher 
level regressions, it is hard to see what the payoff would be of adopting the more complicated approach. 
45 For  m t we use imports net of re-exports of imported goods. Data on imports, exports, and re-exports are all 
taken from the Annual Statements. 
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 similar point estimate (2.325).46 With just 15 annual observations, we are unable 
to address potential political-economy-related endogeneity concerns  regarding our 
OLS estimate, but online Appendix  7 shows that our results are not excessively 
dependent on the value of  κ .
D. Choosing Values for  η 
Finally, we need to choose values for  η , the supply-side elasticity of trans-
formation between domestic output and exports. Let  ε S represent the  own-price 
elasticity of export supply. In a world such as the one we are considering, where 
an economy produces 2 goods, an export good and a  domestic good, and where 
the  elasticity of transformation between these 2 goods is a  constant parameter  η , it 
can be shown that  η =  ε S / (1 −  α X ) , where  α X = 1 −  α D is the share of exports 
in total production.
We assumed that the own-price export supply elasticity estimates for 27 OECD 
countries presented in Tokarick (2014, pp. 1083–85) represented draws from an 
 underlying distribution. The distribution that fit the data best was log-normal, 
with the mean and standard deviation of the underlying normal distribution being 
0.403 and 0.468, respectively. When calculating our trade policy counterfactuals 
we took repeated draws of the log of  ε S from this distribution, and then calculated 
the  corresponding value of  η .
V. Trade Policy Counterfactuals
Armed with the trade elasticities described in the previous section, we can now 
turn our attention to calculating the impact on British imports of Britain’s shift to 
protection from 1931 onward using the model outlined in Section III. For each year, 
we first solve the model using the actual tariffs and quotas in place during that year. 
We then compute equilibria for a counterfactual, “no policy shift,” set of tariffs and 
quotas.47 Since we are interested in the impact of the changes made to British trade 
policy from 1931 onward, in our counterfactual scenarios we set tariffs and quotas 
equal to their actual values for every year between 1924 and 1930. However, in 1931 
and subsequent years, ad valorem tariffs and quotas for each commodity and coun-
try are frozen at their 1930 values. By comparing these actual and  counterfactual 
46 However, the bootstrapping procedure led to very large standard errors at the third (upper-level) stage, 
which is why we rely on the OLS results when simulating our model. Our preferred OLS estimate is presented 
in  equation (1) of online Appendix Table 13. The table presents a range of alternative estimates, in particular 
 expressing imports as a ratio of expenditure. We prefer not to constrain the coefficient on expenditure in this 
 manner on a priori grounds, and also regard the estimates of  κ obtained when we do so as implausibly high. The 
fact that the  Ottaviano-Peri procedure produces a value for  κ that is close to our preferred estimate is another 
 reason for  adopting the latter. Online Appendix 7 shows that while we would have estimated a larger impact of 
trade  policy on the value of trade, had we chosen higher values for  κ , they would not have been very much larger. 
47 Since we have 15 years of data, we construct 15 separate CGE models. In addition to our data on imports 
by commodity and country, we use the data on GDP and imports (net of re-exports) described in Section IVC 
when calibrating our models. Since we only have data on imports of 258 commodities, we scale GDP down so 
as to match the actual ratio of imports to GDP. The model is solved using Mathematical Programming System 
for General Equilibrium (MPSGE) as a subsystem of GAMS (Rutherford 1999). The GAMS code is available on 
request. 
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imports, we can calculate the impact of the shift in protection which took place from 
1931 onward.
Since our elasticities are (mostly) estimated econometrically, we draw 1,000 
 separate values for each of them, from normal distributions whose means and 
 standard errors were described in the previous section. We use these elasticities 
to estimate our counterfactual “no policy shift” equilibrium 1,000 times for each 
year.
A. The Impact of the Change in Trade Policy on the Total Value of Imports
First, we compute the total value of UK imports in our actual and 
 counterfactual   scenarios. Denote these by  I M Actual Total and  I M CF1930 Total , respectively. 
Figure  4 plots the percentage impact of the post-1930 shift in trade policy, i.e., 
100 ×  (I M Actual Total − I M CF1930 Total ) / I M CF1930 Total , for each year between 1930 and 1938. 
It plots not only the average impact across our 1,000 repetitions for each year, but 
the fifth, twenty-fifth, seventy-fifth, and ninety-fifth percentiles, giving a sense of 
how sensitive our results are to changes in the underlying elasticities.
As can be seen, the shift toward protection after 1930 reduced the value of 
British imports quite substantially, by about 9 or 10 percent on average. The 
greatest impact was in 1933: the mean estimated impact on imports in that year 
was 10.8   percent, with twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentile impacts of 8.1 
and 13.5 percent respectively.48 That 10.8 percent decline in UK imports due to 
increased protection was equivalent to 24.7 percent of the total fall in UK imports 
48 The fifth and ninety-fifth percentile impacts were 4.3 and 17.7 percent, respectively. 
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between 1929 and 1933 (the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentile  equivalents 
being 18.6 and 30.8   percent, respectively), and 31.1 percent of the decline in 
imports between 1930 and 1933 (the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentile 
equivalents being 23.5 and 38.9 percent, respectively). These are substantial 
impacts, but they are smaller than the results implied by Kitson and Solomou 
(1990): our benchmark elasticities imply that the post-1930 shift to protection 
lowered UK manufactured imports by 12.6 percent, rather than the 48 percent 
implied by their results.49 Our results are consistent with Irwin’s (1998b) results 
for the United States, and suggest that, as in the United States, the majority of the 
decline in UK imports during this period was due to falling incomes.
B. The Impact of the Change in Trade Policy on the Empire’s Share of UK Imports
We next turn to the impact of protection on the share of UK imports coming 
from the British Empire. Figure 5 plots the actual share in our sample over time, as 
well as the counterfactual share that would have obtained had the UK not changed 
its trade policies after 1930. As before, we plot the mean estimated counterfactual 
share, along with the fifth, twenty-fifth, seventy-fifth, and ninety-fifth percentiles.
As can be seen, protection mattered a lot for the evolution of the Empire’s share 
of British imports. For example, between 1930 and 1935 this share rose from 
27  percent to 39.2 percent. However, if Britain had not adopted quotas and higher 
and more  discriminatory tariffs from 1931 onward, it would only have increased 
to 31.4   percent using our mean estimate. (The twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth 
49 Using the same definition of manufactured imports as in Table 6; see online Appendix 1. 


















348 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW FEBRUARY 2019
 percentile counterfactual estimates for 1935 are 30.4 and 32.4,  respectively.)50 
Our  mean  estimate implies that protection accounted for 77   percent of the shift 
toward Empire between 1930 and 1933 (the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth  percentile 
 equivalents being 67.7 and 86.1 percent, respectively), and for 64 percent of the shift 
between 1930 and either 1934 or 1935. If we had simply assumed that  γ was equal 
to 1, the estimated impact of protection on the share of UK imports coming from the 
Empire would have been slightly lower (see online Appendix 7), but it would still 
have accounted for 71.9 percent of the shift toward Empire between 1930 and 1933. 
These are large effects.
UK tariffs and quotas were not the only factor at work during this period 
 influencing geographical patterns of trade. As Figure 5 shows, the Empire would 
have increased its share of British imports in the 1930s even had United Kingdom 
trade  policy remained constant. Explaining this residual counterfactual increase 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but there are several obvious candidates. 
First, as other trade blocs adopted similar discriminatory trade policies, British 
Empire producers may have lost markets there and increased their exports to the 
UK in response. Second, UK policy promoted imports from the Empire in ways 
not taken account of by our tariff data: for example, Article 8 of the UK-Indian 
Ottawa  agreement stated that “His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom 
undertake that they will  co-operate in any practicable scheme that may be 
agreed between the  manufacturing, trading and producing interests in the United 
Kingdom and India for promoting, whether by research, propaganda or improved 
marketing, the greater use of Indian cotton in the United Kingdom.” Newspapers 
such as the Daily Mail and Daily Express promoted intra-Imperial trade; a 1934 
 propaganda film made for the Conservative party argued that the Empire was a 
“great family linked together in a blood brotherhood of  loyalty and service… by 
helping our Dominions, we are benefiting ourselves” (Thackeray and Toye 2012, 
pp. 5–6). As geopolitical tension rose during the 1930s, and the threat of war 
loomed larger, intra-Imperial trade came to seem even more desirable on security 
grounds. Despite all these other factors, UK trade policy still accounted for over 
half of Britain’s shift toward Empire as late as 1938.
VI. Conclusion
Previous papers have looked at the interwar relationship between aggregate trade 
flows and the average tariff, and have found that interwar protection mattered less 
for the value of world trade than was traditionally thought. They have also explored 
the interwar relationship between trade bloc membership and bilateral trade flows, 
and concluded that trade blocs mattered less than traditionally thought as well.
In this paper we have estimated the impact of interwar UK trade policies on 
UK imports, using detailed information on trade and trade policy for 258 product 
 categories. Our mean estimates suggest that the shift toward protection in 1931 and 
1932 can account for about one-quarter of the decline in UK imports between 1929 
and 1933, which is in line with previous results for the United States. However, 
50 The fifth and ninety-fifth percentile estimates are 28.9 and 34 percent, respectively. 
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we have also found that the shift toward protection, which was explicitly discrim-
inatory, substantially increased the share of UK imports coming from the British 
Empire. Our mean estimates suggest that trade policy can explain over 70 percent 
of the increase in the Empire’s share of UK imports between 1930 and 1933. Other 
forces served to increase that share still further, but the impact of British protec-
tionism was substantial. As late as 1938, trade policies can still account for over 
50 percent of the shift toward Empire experienced since 1930.
What would we have found had we not had data on tariffs and trade for our 258 
goods? What if we had only been able to calculate tariffs using more aggregate 
data? Calculating average tariffs by dividing tariff revenue by the value of imports is 
standard in the economic history literature, given the lack of uniform trade and tariff 
classifications in the past: as previously noted, it is what Irwin (1998a); Madsen 
(2001); and Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor (2003) all do. Sometimes it has been 
done for broad categories of goods rather than imports as a whole (Lehmann and 
O’Rourke 2011); sometimes it has even been possible to calculate bilateral tariffs 
using the method (Albers 2017). Imagine that it were possible to compute such 
average tariff measures bilaterally, for each of our nine categories  h used in the 
econometric analysis; or more realistically, given the data constraints of the period, 
for agricultural and non-agricultural goods;51 or even more realistically, just for 
aggregate imports. Table  3 presents the results that we would have obtained for 
1933, looking just at the impact of tariffs, if we had only had data on trade and 
trade-weighted average tariffs at these three higher levels of aggregation.52 As can 
be seen, the results regarding the impact of tariffs on the total value of trade are 
essentially unaffected by the level of aggregation, since these depend above all on 
the upper level elasticity of substitution  κ , which was in all cases estimated using 
aggregate data. However, the estimated impact of tariffs on the direction of trade 
falls as the level of aggregation increases: if we had used bilateral trade-weighted 
average tariff data in a one-good model we would have concluded that tariffs only 
51 Where agricultural goods comprise our “grain” and “animal” sectors. 
52 Measuring quotas and their impact using aggregate trade data raises a different set of issues, which is why 
we are focusing here on the impact of aggregation on the estimated impact of tariffs alone. The calculations all 
assume that  γ = 1 . In all cases we calculated tariffs by dividing the bilateral, commodity-specific tariff revenue 
by bilateral, commodity-specific imports (where the number of commodities was 9, 2, or 1); we then estimated the 
trade elasticities  σ , where there were either 9, 2, or 1 of these depending on the level of aggregation; and finally 
we constructed CGE models incorporating 9, 2, or 1 goods, plugged our estimates of  σ into these, and computed 
 counterfactual equilibria keeping tariffs constant at their 1930 levels. In keeping with the spirit of the exercise, we 
used the trade-weighted average tariff data in Clemens and Williamson (2004) to estimate  κ , rather than computing 
unweighted average tariffs using our disaggregated tariff data. The result was to raise the estimate of  κ to 2.816. 
We continued to use our baseline estimates of  η . 
Table 3—The Impact of Data Aggregation
Number of goods in analysis 258 9 2 1
Fall in value of 1933 imports relative to “constant 1930 tariffs” 
 counterfactual (percent) −9.1 −8.4 −10.7 −12.1
Percentage of increase in Empire share 1930–1933 
 explained by post-1930 tariff shift
51.1 45.2 35.0 13.3
Source: See text.
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accounted for 13 percent of the shift toward Empire, whereas in fact they accounted 
for over 50 percent.
Methodologically, this paper suggests that there are advantages to using 
trade and trade policy data that are as disaggregated as possible, and look-
ing at what trade blocs do, as opposed to simply looking at whether they exist. 
Historically, the paper suggests that discriminatory interwar trade policy mattered 
more for trade  patterns than the previous cliometric literature has found. It  certainly 
mattered a lot in the British case; whether what was true for the United Kingdom 
was true  elsewhere is a  question which we hope that future research will address.
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